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Book Review
Richard A. Posner, Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016, pp. 406, $29.95.
Reviewed by S.I. Strong
How Legal Academics Can Participate in Judicial Education:
A How-To Guide by Richard Posner
Introduction
The U.S. legal system has long been characterized as reflecting judicial
rather than legislative supremacy.1 While this approach may seem paradoxical
given the United States’ deep-seated commitment to democracy, most judges
have traditionally been considered worthy of their role in society as a result
of “[t]heir independence in office, and manner of appointment.”2 However,
contemporary commentators now question whether these qualities are
sufficient, given claims that “no selection method can guarantee the continued
fitness of the judiciary.”3 Indeed, many judges “turn out to be ill-suited for
the job,” despite having survived rigorous selection procedures.4 As a result,
confidence in the judicial branch is on the decline.5
S.I. Strong holds a Ph.D. in law, University of Cambridge (U.K.); D.Phil., University of Oxford
(U.K.); J.D., Duke University; and M.P.W., University of Southern California. The author, who
is admitted to practice as an attorney in New York and Illinois and as a solicitor in England and
Wales, is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center and the Manley O. Hudson
Professor of Law at the University of Missouri. Much of this review was informed by the author’s
experiences as a U.S. Supreme Court Fellow, which included extensive work with the Federal
Judicial Center, although the opinions reflected herein are those of the author alone. The author
would also like to thank the late Judge Judith Kaye for her insights and inspiration on subjects
related to this analysis. This review is dedicated to her memory.
1.

See Abram Chayes, How Does the Constitution Establish Justice?, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1026, 1041 (1988);
Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of Judicial Supremacy,
111 Colum. L. Rev. 1137, 1138-39 (2011); Martin H. Redish, Political Consensus, Constitutional
Formulae, and the Rationale for Judicial Review, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1340, 1346 (1990) (book review).

2.

John Marshall, Virginia Ratifying Convention (1788), reprinted in The Founders’
Constitution (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner ed., 1989), http://press-pubs.uchicago.
edu/founders/documents/a3_2_1s26.html.

3.

Wayne Doane, The Membership of Judges in Gender Discriminatory Clubs, 12 Vt. L. Rev. 459, 461
(1987).

4.

Keith R. Fisher, Education for Judicial Aspirants, 43 Akron L. Rev. 163, 164 (2010). Studies have
also shown that unconstrained judicial independence can be disastrous. See Frank B. Cross,
Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 195, 199-202 (2003).

5.

See Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Original Sin and Judicial Independence: Providing
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The most common means of improving both professional performance
and public perception of a particular group is through continuing education
initiatives.6 However, significant questions arise as to whether a judge can or
should be required to engage in any form of judicial education. At this point,
most U.S. state and all federal judges7 are not currently under any obligation
to engage in any particular form of judicial education before or after their
elevation to the bench, despite the acknowledged severity of the learning
curve for new judges8 and the significant changes to the nature of judging over
the past few decades.9
At this point, very little is known about how someone learns to become
a judge. Not only are judges often hesitant to discuss such matters, perhaps
Accountability for Justices, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1105, 1107 (2009). While commentators often
claim that the judiciary has the highest confidence level of all three branches of government,
when viewed in absolute terms, the actual numbers are actually not very encouraging. See,
e.g., GBA Strategies, Analysis of National Survey of Registered Voters for the National
Center for State Courts (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/
Public%20Trust%20and%20Confidence/2014-State-of-State-Courts-Survey-12042014.ashx
(noting that in November 2014, only fifty-seven percent of the public thought that courts
were unbiased). Political bias was the biggest concern of the survey population. See id.;
see also GBA Strategies, Analysis of National Survey of Registered Voters for the National
Center for State Courts (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/
Public%20Trust%20and%20Confidence/SoSC_2015_Survey%20Analysis.ashx
(noting
that a majority of respondents saw courts as the venue of last resort and preferred alternative
means of dispute resolution).
6.

See Livingston Armytage, Educating Judges: Towards Improving Justice—A Survey of
Global Practice 189, 217-27 (2d ed., 2015); ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary,
Preserving the Judiciary’s Institutional Legitimacy, 37 Brief 54, 55 (2008); Neil Hamilton, Fostering
Professional Formation (Professionalism): Lessons From the Carnegie Foundation’s Five Studies on Educating
Professionals, 45 Creighton L. Rev. 763, 766 (2012).

7.

See Catharine M. White & Maureen E. Conner, Issues and Trends in Judicial Branch
Education 2005 App. 3D (2005) (reflecting information generated through the Judicial
Education Reference Information & Technical Transfer Project (JERITT), which suggests
that only forty percent of states require any form of judicial education); S.I. Strong,
Judicial Education and Regulatory Capture: Does the Current System of Educating Judges Promote a WellFunctioning Judiciary and Adequately Serve the Public Interest? 2015 J. Disp. Resol. 1, 3-4, 7, 19-21 (2015)
[hereinafter Strong, Judicial Education]. Traditionally, most if not all incoming federal judges
attend new judge orientation sessions offered by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), even
though participation is purely voluntary. See The Hon. Jeremy Fogel & S.I. Strong, Judicial
Education, Dispute Resolution and the Life of a Judge: A Conversation with Judge Jeremy Fogel, Director of the
Federal Judicial Center, 2017 J. Disp. Resol. (forthcoming) (reflecting the views of the current
director of the FJC). Supreme Court justices do not participate in any of these programs.

8.

See William Domnarski, In the Opinion of the Court 36 (1996); Emily Kadens, The Puzzle
of Judicial Education: The Case of Chief Justice William de Grey, 75 Brook. L. Rev. 143, 143-44 (2009).

9.

Not only are disputes becoming more complex, but judges are also taking on additional
duties, ranging from case management (leading to the rise of the “managerial” judge
rather than the professional adjudicator) to alternative dispute resolution (as a result of the
increased emphasis on settlement). See Fisher, supra note 4, at 164, 182-85; Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 378 (1982).
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believing that reticence helps protect the mystique of the judiciary,10 but
scholars of the judiciary have also neglected judicial education in favor of
research on other issues such as judicial independence and appointment
mechanisms.11 However, this situation may change as a result of Judge Richard
Posner’s most recent book, Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary.12
The book touches on a number of important issues, but the most
revolutionary element involves Judge Posner’s discussion of how the legal
academy can assist with the education of current and future judges (2).13 As
Section I of this review illustrates, matters relating to academic participation
in judicial education are both contentious and underdeveloped as a matter of
practice and scholarly inquiry, which makes Divergent Paths a welcome addition
to the literature. However, simply raising an issue is often not enough to
trigger change; instead, reformers must identify tangible and realistic plans
to improve a particular field of endeavor. Section II therefore presents and
analyzes Judge Posner’s proposals regarding the academy’s role in judicial
education by comparing his ideas with best practices in the field. In so doing,
this Review, I hope to promote increased debate about the nature and scope
of judicial education in the United States and the ways that legal scholars can
assist both the state and federal judiciaries. Section III concludes by tying the
various strands of discussion together and identifying additional issues that
need to be considered in the coming years.
I. Judicial Education in the United States
For centuries, the concept of judicial education was somewhat paradoxical
in the common-law world. Unlike civil law judges, who were (and continue
to be) given specialized instruction from the very earliest days of their legal
studies, common-law judges, including those in the United States, came to
the bench only after distinguished careers at the bar and essentially “took the
oath, stepped onto the bench, and proceeded to fill the judicial role as if born
in the robe.”14 This approach, which is rooted in medieval English practice,
10.

See Kadens, supra note 8, at 143.

11.

See id. at 145-46; Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 6-11. This situation may be changing
as a result of several recent initiatives relating to the study of judicial education. See, e.g.,
Armytage, supra note 6, at xxvi (outlining recent developments); Cheryl Thomas, Review of
Judicial Training and Education in Other Jurisdictions 32-33 (May 2006) (constituting
a worldwide report prepared for the British Judicial Studies Board), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/
laws/socio-legal/docs/Review_of_Judicial_Train.pdf; Symposium, Judicial Education and the
Art of Judging: From Myth to Methodology, 2015 J. Disp. Resol. 1 (2015) (discussing a variety of
recent initiatives).

12.

Richard A. Posner, Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary (2016).

13.

See also Michael C. Dorf, 65 J. Legal Educ. 186 (2016) (book review); Richard Posner,
Michael C. Dorf’s ‘Review’ of Richard A. Posner, Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary–A
Response by the Book’s Author, 65 J. Legal Educ. 203 (2016). Judge Posner has discussed judicial
education in the past, but only in passing. See Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging
335-37, 347 (2013) [hereinafter Posner, Reflections].

14.

Kadens, supra note 8, at 143-45; Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial
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was based on the assumption that anyone who has become a senior litigator is
sufficiently well-prepared to serve as a judge.15
The traditional approach began to change in the 1960s and 1970s, when
many common-law countries began to appreciate the difficulties judges face
when transitioning from the bar to the bench.16 Some form of judicial education
was deemed to be useful, and the United States revolutionized the field by
creating an independent entity—the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) —with a
statutory mission to provide research on and education to the U.S. federal
judiciary.17 Over the years, a number of similar programs have developed
around the world.18
As momentous as these changes may be, the current system reflects a
number of problems.19 Perhaps the most concerning issue involves the almost
total control exerted by the judiciary over the scope, content, and method of
judicial education in the United States.20 This approach has traditionally been
justified on the twin claims of expertise (i.e., the belief that only judges can
appreciate the particular pressures and demands of acting as judges and thus
are the only persons qualified to act as instructors) and judicial independence.21
However, commentators now question whether the existing approach provides
judges with too much control and operates as a type of regulatory capture.22
Several common-law countries (most notably Australia, Canada and
England) have attempted to counter the problems associated with excessive
judicial control over judicial education by increasing the role that legal
academics play in the development and delivery of educational programs for
judges.23 In particular, these countries have noted the need for academics to be
Design as the Model for Emerging Legal Systems, 11 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 139, 143 (2004).
15.

See Kadens, supra note 8, at 144.

16.

See Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 3.

17.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (2016); Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov [hereinafter
FJC website].

18.

See Armytage, supra note 6, at 13-15. One well-known program is the National Judicial
College, which provides educational programming to U.S. state court judges. See National
Judicial College, http://www.judges.org/. The field has further diversified to include
private, for-profit programs for state, federal, and foreign judges. See Armytage, supra note 6,
at 13-15.

19.

See Armytage, supra note 6, at 15; Thomas, supra note 11, at 108-14; Strong, Judicial Education,
supra note 7, at 3.

20.

See Armytage, supra note 6, at xxx, xlix; Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 4.

21.

See Thomas, supra note 11, at 32-33; ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, supra
note 6, at 56; J. Clifford Wallace, Judicial Education and Training in Asia and the Pacific, 21 Mich. J.
Int’l L. 849, 858-59 (2000).

22.

See Livingston Armytage, Educating Judges: Where to from Here? 2015 J. Disp. Resol. 167 (2015),
172-73; Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 4.

23.

See Armytage, supra note 22, at 172-73. For example, Canada, one of the rising stars of the
field, has adopted a “three pillar” approach to judicial education that considers input from
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involved not only in developing materials relating to the substantive law but
also in creating content relating to what has been referred to as “judge craft”
(i.e., the skills specifically associated with judging).24
In many ways, the proposals made by Judge Posner in Divergent Paths
concerning possible ways that the U.S. legal academy can assist the judiciary
mirror best practices in the field of judicial education (2). However, a number
of issues merit further attention and development.
II. Judge Posner and Judicial Education
Judge Posner claims that the modern judiciary faces three types of problems.
First are structural concerns relating to “the uneven quality of federal judicial
appointments at all levels, excessive delay in filling federal judicial vacancies
. . . , the poor draftsmanship of so many federal statutes, the indeterminacy of
much American law . . . , certain salary anomalies, and excessive expenditures
on federal courthouses” (59-60).25 While many of these matters are beyond
the direct influence of the legal academy, scholars can nonetheless assist with
them. For example, Judge Posner says that academics can do a better job
in helping judges appreciate how uncertain U.S. law is, since judges appear
unaware of that issue (350).
Second are process-oriented concerns involving “how federal judges decide
cases and justify their decisions in judicial opinions” (76). Judge Posner lists
seventeen different items that would benefit from academic attention: legal
formalism, the “rearview mirror syndrome,” a naïveté regarding statutory
interpretation and precedents, excessive use of multifactor tests, the “fetishism
of words,” lack of appreciation for context, passivity (i.e., the tendency to
act merely as an umpire), lack of willingness to change (i.e., professional
conservativism), “complacency and overconfidence,” formulaic decisionmaking, informational challenges, the inability to conduct independent
judicial research, absence of self-knowledge, “a loose attitude toward truth,”
a dedication to “the noble lie,” the restrictions of a generalist judiciary, and a
shortage of diversity (76-192).
Third are managerial concerns (222). Here, Judge Posner lists ten different
issues: management of judicial staff, the absence of collegiality, problems
in macromanagement, managing the system as a whole, judicial work ethic,
judges, academics, and the community. See National Judicial Institute (Can.), https://
www.nji-inm.ca/index.cfm/judicial-education/the-nji-s-judicial-education-portfolio/; see also
Thomas, supra note 11, at 50.
24.

See Thomas, supra note 11, at 13-17 (noting such skills include matters such as opinion writing,
sentencing and dealing with particular types of litigants and evidence); National Judicial
Institute (Can.), supra note 23 (including a course calendar that discusses the “craft of
judging,” including judge craft, court craft and professional craft). The FJC has also begun
to develop this type of programming. See Fogel & Strong, supra note 7.

25.

See also James B. Eaglin & Matthew Alex Ward, Enhancing the Administration of Justice and
Strengthening Judicial Independence Through Independent, Judicial-Based Applied Research Centers, 7 J.
Legal Tech. Risk Mgmt. 77, 78-79 (2014).
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foot-dragging, aging on the bench, excessive travel, workload issues, and
congressional oversight (222-58).
Although these challenges are extremely wide-ranging, Judge Posner has
identified a variety of ways in which the academy can help the judiciary improve
its performance. His plan includes three separate types of initiatives: those
involving legal scholarship (261-96), those involving the law school curriculum
(297-344), and those involving academic participation in continuing judicial
education (345-60).
A. Improvements Involving Legal Scholarship
Judge Posner has criticized contemporary legal scholarship on a number of
previous occasions, claiming that much of the jargon-filled, interdisciplinary
research that is currently in vogue provides little help to judges, even if that
style of writing reflects the fastest route to academic publication and promotion
(291).26 In Divergent Paths, he provides a more nuanced discussion of why that
type of scholarship is so unhelpful, despite the apparent focus on matters of
deep doctrinal importance. First, Judge Posner says that many academics
offer patently unworkable solutions to various legal challenges (266, 284). As
a result, the professoriate should not be surprised when their work is ignored
by the judiciary. Second, he says that academics focus nearly exclusively on
issues relating to “the Supreme Court—the court least likely to pay attention
to academic critique” —even though other courts have in many ways a much
greater effect on both law and society (2).
Judge Posner’s solution is relatively simple: He would “like to see a shift
in academic emphasis from critique of particular decisions and doctrines to
critique of particular judges, and of judging, below the level of the Supreme
Court” (266).27 He also suggests increasing the frequency and diversity of
empirical studies, using data that is readily available from the FJC or the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (275).28
Given his longstanding interest in judicial reasoning, it is not surprising that
Judge Posner makes particular mention of the need for more robust analysis
of the “structure of judicial opinions (as distinct from their content)” on both
an individual and systemic level (269). He would also like to see increased
academic discussion of how to write a good judicial opinion (270)29 and the
26.

See also Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1320 (2002);
Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 Mich. L. Rev.
1921, 1927 (1993). Similar complaints have been voiced by other judges, most notably
Chief Justice Roberts. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Prof Responds After Chief Justice
Disses Legal Scholarship, ABA J. (July 7, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
law_prof_responds_after_chief_justice_roberts_disses_legal_scholarship/.

27.

Posner notes that this analysis would need to be systemic to be effective.

28.

The FJC routinely provides assistance to academics working on judicial research. See Fogel
& Strong, supra note 7.

29.

Some work has been done in this regard. See S.I. Strong, Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions:
A Guide for Novice, Experienced and Foreign Judges, 2015 J. Disp. Resol. 93 (2015) [hereinafter
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effect of certain psychological or sociological phenomenon (such as implicit,
hindsight or status quo bias) on judicial decision-making (273).30
Perhaps the most provocative of Judge Posner’s proposals involves a call
for an increase in “collaborative research between law professors and judges”
(262), which he says would produce scholarship that is more responsive to
judges’ needs and concerns (285). Divergent Paths provides several tangible
examples of how Judge Posner has himself facilitated such research, which
may give academics some ideas on how to proceed in this regard (286-95).
Though useful in its way, Judge Posner’s advice has its limits, particularly
for scholars who do not personally know any like-minded judges.31 Fortunately,
there are a number of existing initiatives that would facilitate increased
collaboration between the academy and the judiciary, although Judge Posner
does not mention them by name.32 The most notable of these programs is
the U.S. Supreme Court Fellowship, which provides midcareer and junior
professionals with a unique opportunity to study the workings of the federal
judiciary at the highest level.33 Supreme Court Fellows work closely with the
FJC, the Administrative Office, the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the
Office of the Counselor to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and develop
precisely the type of collaborative relationships that Judge Posner says are
critical to the production of useful legal scholarship (275).34 Chief Justice
John Roberts recently adopted a number of innovations meant to increase the
scholarly nature of the program and lay the groundwork for more practical
scholarship concerning the judiciary,35 and those efforts have already met with
success.36
Strong, Judicial Opinions].
30.

Some work has been done in this regard. See Judge Jeremy D. Fogel, Mindfulness and
Judging (2016), http://www.fjc.gov; Kathleen Mahoney, Judicial Bias: The Ongoing Challenge,
2015 J. Disp. Resol. 43, 62 (2015) (discussing concerns about implicit or unconscious bias).

31.

Judge Posner admits that it can be difficult to establish the necessary relationships. See id. at
287-88.

32.

See, e.g., Judicial Branch of California, Judicial Administration Fellowship, http://www.courts.
ca.gov/judicialfellowship.htm; National Center for State Courts, ICM Fellows, http://
www.ncsc.org/Education-and-Careers/ICM-Fellows/Fellow-Speech.aspx.

33.

See Jon B. Gould et al., Courting Success: The Supreme Court Fellows Program at 35, 41 PS: Pol. Sci. &
Pols. 839 (2008); S.I. Strong, The U.S. Supreme Court Fellows Program: The Opportunity of a Lifetime,
53 Judges’ J. 27, 27-31 (2014) [hereinafter Strong, Supreme Court Fellows].

34.

See also Strong, Supreme Court Fellows, supra note 33, at 30-31.

35.

See Strong, Supreme Court Fellows, supra note 33, at 30-31.

36.

See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, Judicial Sabbaticals (1987), http://www.fjc.gov (written while the
author was a Supreme Court Fellow based at the FJC); Eaglin & Ward, supra note 25, at
77 (reflecting an article co-authored by the director of the FJC’s Research Division and a
former Supreme Court Fellow); Jennifer A. Segal, The Role of Family Ties Departures in Federal
Sentencing, 13 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 258 (2001) (written while the author was Supreme Court
Fellow based at the Sentencing Commission); Strong, Supreme Court Fellows, supra note 33, at
30 (discussing a symposium on judicial education undertaken by a former Supreme Court
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Another means of facilitating cooperative research between judges and
academics is through the creation of independent applied research centers
focusing on matters relating to the judiciary.37 A recent study identified 478 such
entities around the world.38 Scholars interested in conducting collaborative
research of the type proposed by Judge Posner could easily contact one or
more of these organizations to propose projects of mutual interest (275).39
B. Improvements Involving the Law School Curriculum
After discussing various improvements to legal scholarship, Divergent Paths
considers how to enhance the law school curriculum (297-344). Although
Judge Posner recognizes that only a very small number of law students will ever
find themselves sitting on the bench, he nevertheless says that law schools can
provide a distinct service to the judiciary by better preparing future advocates
(333) and law clerks.40 Unsurprisingly, given his earlier writings, Judge Posner
says the best way to do so is to reduce the role of legal formalism in law school
and increase the emphasis on legal pragmatism (305, 322).41
Divergent Paths contains four major proposals in this regard. The first focuses
on how substantive courses are taught and suggests that professors alter
both their lecture style and the type of materials used in class (305-07).42 For
example, rather than relying on heavily edited casebooks, Judge Posner advises
professors to circulate cases in their original, unedited form along with a series
of questions that are to be considered by the students before coming to class
(306-07). As radical as this proposal may seem, this method has been used with
great success at two of the world’s most renowned universities, the University of
Oxford and the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom.43 Not only
Fellow based at the FJC); see also Supreme Court Fellows Alumni Association, http://
scfellowsalumni.squarespace.com/ (including a full list of alumni publications).
37.

See Eaglin & Ward, supra note 25, at 77.

38.

See id. at Appx.

39.

Both U.S. and foreign entities are listed.

40.

As Judge Posner notes, many law clerks write the first draft of various legal decisions and
opinions, which has an enormous effect on the style and content of those rulings. See id. at
334, 351; Strong, Judicial Opinions, supra note 29, at 98, 111-12.

41.

Formalism requires readers to “fit legal doctrine . . . to every new case.” Id. at 305; see also
id. at 317 (discussing the problems of formalism). Judge Posner has long considered legal
formalism to be problematic. See Posner, Reflections, supra note 13, at 110-11; Richard
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 179-217 (1986).

42.

The rationale is that the heavy editing of contemporary casebooks emphasizes doctrine
over facts, thereby giving students an unrealistic view of the judicial process and judicial
decision-making. See id. at 307.

43.

See Times Higher Education, World Reputation Rankings, https://www.timeshighereducation.
com/world-university-rankings/2015/reputation-ranking#!/page/0/length/25
(listing
Cambridge as number two and Oxford as number three in the world);
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has this approach proved capable of producing exemplary legal thinkers,44 it
also reduces the cost of legal education by eliminating the need for expensive
casebooks (306). Furthermore, the basic methodology can be easily adapted
for use in U.S. law schools.45
Judge Posner’s second proposal concerns the type of courses offered in
the standard law school curriculum and includes a desire to see an increased
emphasis on how judicial decisions and opinions are written (305, 334-35).
Although such courses provide an immediate and obvious benefit to students
who work as judicial clerks after graduation, these types of classes also offer
non-clerks important insights into how chambers operate (307-11).
Several of Judge Posner’s suggestions on how to conduct such courses
contradict conventional wisdom about best practices in legal and judicial
writing and should be considered carefully before they are adopted.46 However,
other ideas, particularly the suggestion that law students be deliberately
exposed to excellence in judicial and other types of writing, hold great merit
(307-11).47 While Divergent Paths lists some of Judge Posner’s favorite judicial
authors (337), other resources are available. For example, the Green Bag Almanac
& Reader provides a list of the best legal writing produced in the United States
each year.48
Another curricular proposal involves reducing “the headlock that adversary
procedure has on the American legal profession,” which Judge Posner says
produces judges who are unnecessarily bound by formalist concerns and
practices (318).49 Instead, he says that the academy should adopt teaching
techniques that seek “to persuade judges to broaden their intellectual horizons,
to innovate, to understand the breadth of their discretion and exercise it
44.

See Joe Hall, The World’s Best Universities for Law, City A.M. (May 21, 2015), http://www.cityam.
com/216197/worlds-best-universities-law-cambridge-and-oxford-trump-uk-competition
(noting the law program at Cambridge is ranked number two in the world and Oxford is
number three).

45.

See University of Oxford, Oxford Learning Institute, https://www.learning.ox.ac.uk/support/
teaching/resources/teaching/ (describing the tutorial system); see also Williams College,
Tutorials, http://www.williams.edu/academics/tutorials/ (noting the adaption of the
Oxbridge system for U.S. undergraduates at one of the country’s top colleges). The current
author taught law at both the University of Oxford and the University of Cambridge and
has adapted many of those teaching techniques for use in U.S. law schools.

46.

For example, Judge Posner is adamantly against the use of headers, although numerous
experts on writing believe that headers improve readers’ comprehension. Compare id. at 315
with Strong, Judicial Opinions, supra note 29, at 117.

47.

Interestingly, the students did not agree with Judge Posner about what constituted a model
opinion. See Posner, supra note 12, at 307-11.

48.

The Green Bag Almanac & Reader, Exemplary Legal Writing, http://www.greenbag.org/
green_bag_press/almanacs/almanacs.html; see also Domnarski, supra note 8, at 97-98.

49.

The director of the FJC has also criticized this phenomenon and discussed ways of
addressing the issue. See Fogel & Strong, supra note 7 (suggesting increased exposure to
alternative means of dispute resolution early in the law school curriculum).
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imaginatively” (282).50 As an example of this type of imaginative discretion,
Judge Posner suggests that judges be encouraged to conduct their own legal
or factual research in appropriate cases (318). While some observers may
oppose independent judicial research,51 Judge Posner defends his position on
the grounds that (1) civil law legal systems grant judges significant discretion
in directing and participating in the development of relevant evidence (318),
and (2) “the adversary system is not enthroned in the Constitution and is
riddled with exceptions”(369). Interestingly, this discussion could be read
as suggesting that Judge Posner would support an increased emphasis on
comparative law in the law school curriculum, both as a standalone course
and as an element of other substantive courses. Other courses that he supports
include those “in finance, accounting, business management, computer
science . . . , statistics . . . , economics, psychology, political science, medicine
and biology, fingerprint and DNA evidence, electronic surveillance, and the
patent system” (325).52
The third major proposal in this section of Divergent Paths involves a call to
increase the number of clinical professors on law school faculties (323, 342).
Although other experts have made similar suggestions in the past,53 Judge
Posner goes further, suggesting that “[c]linical education deserves emphasis
not merely as a supplement to conventional law courses but also as a substitute
for some of them” (323). In making this recommendation, Judge Posner is
speaking from experience, having taught various simulation courses at the
University of Chicago Law School, including an innovative class that used
students as judges in mock trial simulations (323, 330). This latter approach
is extremely educational, says Judge Posner, since “lawyers don’t learn a great
deal about judges from appearing before them” (324).
In many ways, this aspect of Divergent Paths correlates directly to certain
reforms recently adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) regarding the
U.S. law school curriculum (383-84).54 According to the new ABA protocols,
50.

See also Fogel, supra note 30; Chad M. Oldfather, Of Judges, Law, and the River: Tacit Knowledge
and the Judicial Role, 2015 J. Disp. Resol. 155, 158 (2015) (noting that “good judging necessarily
entails drawing on another sort of unconscious influence—in this case, one that we want to
celebrate and cultivate”).

51.		
See Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 Duke L.J. 1263, 1267
(2007) (stating the rules governing independent [factual] research are astonishingly unclear”
and noting the bench is sharply divided as to what the best course of action is); see also
United States v. Bari, 599 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing independent judicial research
on the Internet). Independent legal research is considered less problematic. See Hampton
v. Wyant, 296 F.3d 560, 564-65 (7th Cir. 2002); Camacho v. Trimble Irrevocable Trust, 756
N.W.2d 596, 298-99 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2008); Strong, Judicial Opinions, supra note 29, at 108.
52.

Posner notes that such courses could be offered at the undergraduate level or through
massive open online courses (MOOCs).

53.

See, e.g., Robert R. Kuehn, Pricing Clinical Legal Education, 92 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1, 13-18 (2014)
(discussing the 1992 MacCrate Report and the 2007 Carnegie Foundation report).

54.

See ABA, Accreditation Overview, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/
resources/accreditation.html; Report and Recommendations, American Bar Association,
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students must now take six credit hours of clinical, experiential, or skills-related
courses before graduation.55 This requirement not only conforms to Judge
Posner’s views about how to educate law students, it also corresponds to best
practices in judicial and adult education, which advocate experiential learning
whenever possible.56 Interestingly, Judge Posner’s students were somewhat
disappointed in his simulation course on the grounds that it “slighted legal
doctrine,” which raises questions about how students will respond to the new
ABA requirement about experiential coursework (323).57
The ABA also now requires law schools to formalize the process of
identifying and developing learning outcomes and assessment methods on
both individual and institutional levels.58 Judge Posner strongly favors this
process, claiming that it would be “highly desirable” for law schools “to decide
what every student should know about judges by the time of graduation and
how they should acquire that knowledge” (343). Not only would this approach
increase the number of advocates who truly understand what judges need
(343), it would also help the faculty who teach these types of courses learn
more about judges, thereby helping to narrow the separation between the
judiciary and the academy (343-44).
The book’s final recommendation for law schools involves the relationship
between the faculty and the bastions of student autonomy: law review and moot
court (340). While some of Judge Posner’s proposals (such as the suggestion
that law students sit as moot court judges) may be well-received as a means of
empowering students (340), other suggestions (such as the notion that faculty,
rather than students, should administer law reviews and moot court programs)
may be more controversial, even though the proposals are premised on the
notion that increasing the role of the faculty in law reviews and moot court will
improve the educational value of both endeavors (340-41).59
C. Improvements Involving Continuing Judicial Education
The final section of Divergent Paths focuses on how academics can become
involved with continuing judicial education for sitting judges (345-85).
Task Force on the Future of Legal Education (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/taskforceonthefuturelegaleducation.html.
55.

See Am. Bar Ass’n, Standards and Rules of Procedure
2015-2016, Standards 301-05 [hereinafter ABA Standards].

56.

See Armytage, supra note 6, at 152-62; S. Brettel Dawson, Judicial Education: Pedagogy for Change,
2015 J. Disp. Resol. 175, 175 (2015); Fogel & Strong, supra note 7 (discussing courses at the
FJC).

57.

Notably, this confirms Judge Posner’s belief that law students are natural formalists. See id. at
307, 316.

58.

See ABA Standards, supra note 55, Standards 301-02, 314-15.

59.

Students would still participate in both programs, but under increased faculty oversight. See
id.
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Although other experts have also raised this issue,60 the tangible nature of
Judge Posner’s proposals and the esteem with which he is held in both judicial
and academic circles could generate real change in this regard.
Perhaps the most useful aspect of Judge Posner’s discussion involves the
way in which he distinguishes between courses relating to the substance of
the law and courses relating to judging and the judicial process (346). As
important and prevalent as the former type of instruction is, Judge Posner
says that such courses are often unnecessary, given that judges usually receive
sufficient briefing from the parties on relevant points of procedural and
substantive law (346). As a result, Judge Posner says that the primary need for
judicial education is “in judging rather than doctrine” (351). Experts in judicial
education often use the term “judge craft” to describe the skills specifically
associated with judging.61
Divergent Paths is therefore consistent with a number of best practices in the
area of judicial education, particularly with respect to the way in which the
text calls for educational programming on matters ranging from the natural
and social sciences (which would help judges apply legal doctrine in an
appropriate manner) (351) 62 to criminology (which would lead to an improved
understanding of matters relating to recidivism) (348) and judicial writing
(350-51).63 However, the book is somewhat more polemical when it calls for
courses concerning the details of the legislative process (which Judge Posner
says would help with statutory interpretation) and psychological factors (such
as implicit, hindsight and cognitive bias) that can affect decision-making
or that involve judicial “self-deception” (350).64 Some of the types of selfdeception that bother Judge Posner the most involve the idea that the law is
clearly ascertainable and that judges can and do apply the law to the facts free
of any external or preexisting influences (351). He also claims that many judges
exaggerate their ability to maintain control of decision-making when opinions
are initially drafted by law clerks (351).
The difficulty here is not with the content of the proposed coursework,
since experts in judicial education have supported this type of programming
60.

See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 11, at 50; Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 17; National
Judicial Institute (Can.), supra note 23 (discussing the “three-pillar” approach).

61.

See Thomas, supra note 11, at 13-17 (noting such skills include matters such as opinion-writing,
sentencing and dealing with particular types of litigants and evidence); National Judicial
Institute (Can.), supra note 23 (including a course calendar that discusses the “craft of
judging,” including judge craft, court craft and professional craft).

62.

This suggestion has been echoed by other judges. See Fogel & Strong, supra note 7; Chief
Justice Mary R. Russell, Toward a New Paradigm of Judicial Education, 2015 J. Disp. Resol. 79,
80-86 (2015).

63.

There is some recent scholarship on this issue. See Strong, Judicial Opinions, supra note 29, at
93-128.

64.

The FJC has sought to address this issue. See Fogel, supra note 30.
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for years.65 Instead, the primary problem is that most judges cannot currently
be compelled to attend any form of continuing judicial education, let alone
programs on a particular subject.66 Judges are also extremely sensitive to
any suggestion that they are affected by “priors,” despite overwhelming
psychological and sociological evidence that every human being is subject to
such influences (352).67 As a result, Judge Posner correctly notes that those
judges who are most in need of this type of programming will not enroll in
the necessary courses of their own accord (359).68 Furthermore, this kind of
coursework is especially necessary because judges were not exposed to these
issues while in law school (351).
Although he admits that the inability to compel attendance is problematic,
Judge Posner concludes that that he has no answer to that particular issue (359).
To some extent, this type of reticence is understandable, since it allows him
to avoid the “vexed question” of mandatory judicial education.69 Numerous
judges oppose such measures as “insulting,” and it may be that Judge Posner
counts himself among that number.70 However, given the extensive research
regarding the effectiveness and importance of judicial education71 and Judge
Posner’s own views about the problems with judicial performance and
preparation,72 the absence of any detailed discussion about the possibility of
mandatory judicial education is disappointing. Such a discussion could have
proceeded on pragmatic grounds (Judge Posner’s preferred methodology)
and focused on whether mandatory judicial education would be likely to
resolve the problems currently facing the U.S. judiciary;73 Judge Posner also
could have taken a more theoretical turn and considered whether the current
65.

See Armytage, supra note 6, at 166-73.

66.

See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.

67.

See also Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 65-66 (2008) (defining the term “prior” as
“prior probability,” meaning a judge’s predisposition to view a set of facts in a particular
manner); Oldfather, supra note 50, at 157 (noting the challenge for judges “stems from the
need to give play to some unconscious influences but not others, and . . . is complicated
by the fact that the line between legitimate and illegitimate influences is both blurry and
contestable”).

68.

See also Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 15 (describing the likelihood of such an
outcome).

69.

See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Director of the National Judicial Education Program,
Testimony to the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct 15 (Apr. 2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
judicialethics/resources/Comm_Code_HechtSchafran_0504ddt.authcheckdam.pdf.

70.

Id.

71.

See Armytage, supra note 6, at 24-41; ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, supra
note 6, at 55; Hamilton, supra note 6, at 766.

72.

See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.

73.

See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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system of judicial education constitutes a form of regulatory capture.74 Either
approach would have provided important insights into what is becoming an
increasingly contentious issue.75
Concerns about judicial self-regulation have become so pressing that some
people have called for the appointment of an Inspector General with powers
over the judiciary.76 Compared with that initiative, reshaping the U.S. approach
to judicial education appears far less problematic from both theoretical and
doctrinal perspectives.77 However, both propositions have been opposed by
the judiciary on similar grounds, namely that such measures hinder judicial
independence.78 While a detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope
of this Review, concerns about judicial independence appear unwarranted
in cases involving judicial education, given that judges are supposed to be
eminently capable of distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant material.79
Furthermore, nothing appears objectionable about educational measures that
provide judges with information necessary to make decisions.80 As a result, it
would be very illuminating to hear Judge Posner’s perspective on this debate,
particularly given his views on judicial discretion (318)81 and his respect for
civil law legal traditions, which feature a much more rigorous approach to
judicial education (318).82
Although Divergent Paths fails to address questions relating to mandatory
forms of judicial education, Judge Posner nevertheless offers a variety of useful
ideas on how law schools can help provide the judiciary with appropriate
educational offerings, should judges wish to partake in such courses. For
74.

See Lara A. Bazelon, Putting the Mice in Charge of the Cheese: Why Federal Judges Cannot Always Be
Entrusted to Police Themselves and What Congress Can Do About It, 97 Ky. L. J. 439, 443 (2008-2009);
Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 5-6; see also In re Opinion of the Judicial Conference
Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders, 449 F.3d 106, 117 (U.S.
Jud. Conference Comm. 2006) (Winter, J., dissenting) (“A self-regulatory procedure suffers
from the weaknesses that many observers will be suspicious that complainants against judges
will be disfavored. The Committee’s decision in this case can only fuel such suspicion.”).

75.

See In re Opinion of the Judicial Conference Committee, 449 F.3d at 117 (Winter, J., dissenting); The
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Study Comm., Implementation of the Judicial Conduct
and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice, 239 F.R.D. 116, 178 (2006); Bazelon,
supra note 74, at 443; Carrington & Cramton, supra note 5, at 1139-40; Strong, Judicial Education,
supra note 7, at 5-6.

76.

See Bazelon, supra note 74, at 443.

77.

See id. (discussing constitutional concerns); Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 10-11.

78.

See The Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Judicial Governance and Judicial Independence, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
779, 789-97 (2015); Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 10-11.

79.

See Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 11.

80.

See Dawson, supra note 56, at 179; Eaglin & Ward, supra note 25, at 107; Fogel & Strong,
supra note 7; Judge R.L. Young, Worldwide Common Law Judiciary Conference, 45 Fed. Law. 40, 44
(Nov./Dec. 1998).

81.

See also supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.

82.

See also Kadens, supra note 8, at 143-45; Koch, supra note 14, at 143.
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example, he suggests that law schools can help judges overcome problems
relating to self-management, management of staff members and management
of the courtroom through narrowly tailored coursework on these issues (350,
356-57).83 He says he considers these types of classes particularly important
given the scarcity of scholarship on such matters (277, 287).84
Divergent Paths also provides helpful advice regarding the form of judicial
programming.85 Thus, Judge Posner suggests offering short, intensive courses
to respect the demands of judicial dockets and advocates reliance on faculty
from other fields, such as management, psychology or sociology, to provide
information on matters falling outside the competence of law professors
(351-52). A number of these recommendations conform to best practices in
the field.86 However, Judge Posner does not address a number of important
considerations, such as those relating to budget shortfalls, even though those
measures are having a significant effect on judicial education throughout the
country.87
Some critics might suggest that law schools need not become involved in
continuing judicial education because the field is already saturated.88 However,
Judge Posner recognizes that many existing programs are limited in scope or
operate under certain restrictions that make educational innovation difficult
(357-59).89 Consequently, law schools may be able to fill a gap left by some of
the more well-established institutions (358).90
III. Conclusion
Divergent Paths is a remarkable book that provides a welcome introduction
to the important and often overlooked issue of judicial education.91 The text
83.

Notably, judicial education centers such as the FJC are already offering a number of
management and process-type issues, although Judge Posner discounts these courses (35759); Fogel & Strong, supra note 7; FJC Website, supra note 17.

84.

Judge Posner generally supports self-education, but notes that such efforts may be unavailing
if there are insufficient materials (360).

85.

See Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 21.

86.

Experts in judicial education draw on research in adult education to identify the best means
of delivering educational content to judges. See Armytage, supra note 6, at 111-38 (discussing
how andragogy differs from pedagogy); Dawson, supra note 56, at 189; Fogel & Strong, supra
note 7. For example, judges are known to benefit more from experiential coursework than
lectures. See Schafran, supra note 69, at 1072 n. 52.

87.

See Armytage, supra note 6, at xxix; Fogel & Strong, supra note 7.

88.

See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text (describing federal, state, and private forms of
judicial education).

89.

The FJC has adopted a number of innovations in recent years that address some of Judge
Posner’s concerns. See id.; Fogel & Strong, supra note 7.

90.

Fogel & Strong, supra note 7.

91.

See Kadens, supra note 8, at 143-44.

436

Journal of Legal Education

not only identifies topics on which more judicial education is needed,92 it also
offers a wide range of ideas on how legal academics can help judges overcome
certain ongoing challenges (361-68). However, some areas could be improved
upon.93
The first issue involves the way Judge Posner limits his analysis to those
institutions with which he is most familiar (i.e., the federal judiciary and elite
law schools) (xii). Although this technique demonstrates a laudable humility,
many of the issues discussed in Divergent Paths are as relevant to state court
judges and the law schools from which those judges come as they are to federal
judges and elite law schools.94 Furthermore, Divergent Paths contains important
implications for the significant number of U.S. judges who have no legal
training whatsoever.95
Second, significant questions have been raised about the propriety of
judicial education programs offered by certain private interest groups,
including programs based at various law schools.96 Commentators have
suggested that these types of programs may become more popular given the
funding problems faced by many judicial systems,97 and it would be helpful to
have Judge Posner’s views on this particular practice. Indeed, this is an issue
that could be usefully subjected to an economic analysis considering hidden
costs, negative externalities, and public goods associated with public versus
private forms of judicial education.
92.

Needs assessments are critical in judicial education. See Armytage, supra note 6, at 69107 (discussing pros and cons of needs assessments as well as various methodologies); see
also European Judicial Training Network, Good Judicial Training Practices, http://www.
ejtn.eu/Resources/Good-judicial-training-practices/ (containing various types of needs
assessments). However, one cannot rely exclusively on self-assessment to determine
educational needs and goals. See Shirley A. Dobbin et al., Surveying Difficult Populations: Lessons
Learned from a National Survey of State Trial Court Judges, 22 Just. System J. 287, 288 (2001).

93.

Recent scholarship in this area of law has identified a number of critical concerns that were
not addressed by Judge Posner. See Thomas, supra note 11, at 108-14; Strong, Judicial Education,
supra note 7, at 8-21.

94.

Many state court judges attend public or so-called non-elite law schools. For example, of the
seven current Missouri State Supreme Court judges, four graduated from law school at the
University of Missouri, one from Howard, one from Georgetown and one from Washington
University in St. Louis. See Missouri Courts, Supreme Court Judges, https://www.courts.
mo.gov/page.jsp?id=133.

95.

See North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 339 (1976); Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 3
(noting that in many states, lower-court judges have not attended law school and may not
have completed college).

96.

See Chris Young, Reity O’Brien & Andrea Fuller, Corporations, Pro-Business Nonprofits Foot Bill
for Judicial Seminars, Center for Public Integrity (May 27, 2014, 6:00AM), http://www.
publicintegrity.org/2013/03/28/12368/corporations-pro-business-nonprofits-foot-billjudicial-seminars; Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs? Should
Judicial Education Be Privatized?: Questions of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 941,
941-44 (2002); Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 11.

97.

See Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 11.
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Another issue that might benefit from an economic or similar analysis
involves the question of whether judicial selection procedures can or do result
in a well-functioning and well-informed judiciary. Judicial selection has long
been considered a proxy for judicial competence, but the rationality of that
assumption has never been established, empirically or theoretically.98
Finally, more discussion is needed regarding the proper role and function of
judges.99 Judge Posner considers this issue to some extent in his discussion of
legal formalism (305, 317, 322) and his analysis of Chief Justice Roberts’ claim
that a judge is meant to act solely as an “umpire” (318).100 However, Judge
Posner does not discuss how differing views of what it means to be a judge can
or should be taken into account by providers of judicial education.101 While
he may believe that questions of the judicial role should not be addressed in
educational programming because of concerns about judicial independence,
it is difficult if not impossible to construct an appropriate curriculum without
at least some appreciation of what it is that judges are meant to do.102
These are just a few of the issues that Judge Posner and other scholars of
the judiciary will hopefully address in the future. However, scholarship is not
the only way to advance the discussion regarding judicial education (361-68).
For example, one of Judge Posner’s hopes is for increased interaction among
the judiciary, the academy, and the bar (360).103 Although the American Legal
Institute (ALI) was originally created to foster such relationships, Judge
Posner says that the ALI’s current direction precludes useful collaboration
among the different elements of the legal profession (36-40). However, some
of those shortcomings could be reversed if the ALI were to initiate a project
that focused specifically on judging and the role of judges.104 Indeed, Judge
Posner, as an eminent member of the ALI, would make an excellent Reporter
for such a project (39).
As the preceding suggests, judicial education is fundamentally important
to a well-functioning society, and Divergent Paths does an excellent job in
highlighting a number of critical concerns from the U.S. perspective. Francis
Bacon once said, “Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend
98.

See id. at 10.

99.

See Armytage, supra note 6, at 164-93; Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 19-20.

100. John Roberts, My Job Is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat, CNN (Sept. 12, 2005)
(reproducing Chief Justice Roberts’ opening statement during his confirmation hearings),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/.
101. Individual judges can and do adopt extremely diverse philosophies of judging. See Fogel &
Strong, supra note 7.
102. See Robert G. Bone, Judging as Judgment: Tying Judicial Education to Adjudication Theory, 2015 J.
Disp. Resol. 129, 129 (2015); Dawson, supra note 56, at 176-77; Strong, Judicial Education, supra
note 7, at 19.
103. Judge Posner says that the Sedona Conference provides an excellent model for bringing
together judges and practicing lawyers.
104. See American Law Institute, Project Life Cycle, https://www.ali.org/projects/project-life-cycle/.
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than plausible, and more advised than confident.”105 Fortunately, Judge
Posner’s most recent contribution to the legal literature provides an excellent
guide on how to achieve these goals.

105. Francis Bacon, The Philosophical Works
ed., 1905).

of

Francis Bacon 802 (John M. Robertson

